Habitual Control of Goal Selection in Humans

Fiery Cushman1 and Adam Morris1

1Department of Psychology, Harvard University

33 Kirkland St., Cambridge, MA 20138

Major classification: Social Sciences

Minor classification: Psychological and Cognitive Sciences

Keywords: Planning, goal selection, habit, reinforcement learning

**Corresponding Author:**

Fiery Cushman

Department of Psychology

Harvard University

33 Kirkland St.

Cambridge, MA 02138

cushman@fas.harvard.edu

(617) 512-7010

ORCID: 0000-0002-6929-9982

**Abstract**

Humans choose actions based on both habit and planning. Habitual control is computationally frugal but adapts slowly to novel circumstances, while planning is computationally expensive but can adapt swiftly. Current research emphasizes the competition between habits and plans for behavioral control, yet many complex tasks instead favor their integration. We consider a hierarchical architecture that exploits the computational efficiency of habitual control to select goals while preserving the computational flexibility of planning to achieve those goals. We formalize this mechanism in a reinforcement learning setting, illustrate its costs and benefits, and experimentally demonstrate its spontaneous application in a sequential decision-making task.

**Significance Statement**

Human cognition makes widespread use of goal-directed planning. Yet, exhaustive forward planning for tasks of real-world complexity is prohibitively computationally demanding. Much research aims to find efficient mechanisms for approximate planning. We describe an approach to this problem that exploits the computational efficiency of habit learning to select goal states that are subsequently used in planning. We also provide experimental evidence that humans implement this approach. Our findings illuminate the basis of learning and choice in humans, demonstrate an integration between mechanisms of habitual and planned control, and contribute to our development of computationally tractable planning algorithms.

/body

**Introduction**

The distinction between habitual and planned action is fundamental to behavioral research (1-4). Habits enable computationally efficient decision making, but at the cost of behavioral flexibility. They form as stimulus-response pairings are “stamped in” following reward, as in Thorndike’s law of effect (3). Planning, in contrast, enables more flexible and productive decision-making. It is accomplished by first searching over a causal model linking candidate actions to their expected outcomes and then selecting actions based on their anticipated rewards. Planning imposes a severe computational cost, however, as the size and complexity of a model grows.

Past research emphasizes the competition between habitual and planned control of behavior (5, 6). Habitual control is favored when an individual has extensive experience with a task and when the optimal behavior policy is relatively consistent across time; meanwhile, planning is favored for novel tasks and when the optimal policy is variable, provided that an agent represents an adequate model of their task (7).

Methods of integrating habitual and planned control have received less attention (8-10), yet real world tasks often favor elements of each. Consider, for instance, a seasoned journalist who reports on new events each day. At a high level of abstraction, her reporting is structured around a repetitive series of goal-directed actions: Follow leads, interview sources, evade meddling editors, etc. Because these actions are reliably valuable for any news event, their selection is an excellent candidate for habitual control. The concrete steps necessary to carry out any individual action will be highly variable, however—optimal behavior when interviewing a pop star may be suboptimal when interviewing the Pope. Thus, the implementation of the abstract actions is an excellent candidate for planning. This example illustrates the utility of nesting elements of both habits and plans in a hierarchy of behavioral control (11-13).

Indeed, it is widely recognized that humans mentally organize their behavior around hierarchically organized goals and subgoals (3, 14, 15). In principle, hierarchical organization can be implemented exclusively by habitual control (16), or exclusively by planning (13, 17). Yet, these homogenous mechanisms foreclose the possibility of tailoring the means of control (habit vs. planning) to the affordances of a particular level of behavioral abstraction. Our aim is to show that humans solve this dilemma by exerting habitual control over the process of goal selection, while using planning to attain the goal.

Traditionally, habits are modeled as a learned association between a perceptual stimulus and motor response. Our proposal entails an extension of habit learning to the relation between superordinate and subordinate goals: A superordinate goal can serve as the internally represented stimulus triggering a cognitive response of subordinate goal selection. Thus, for instance, the goal of getting an interview with a key source might be “stamped in” due to the history of reward associated with selecting this goal in past news-reporting episodes.

Colloquially, this captures the idea of a “habit of thought”: habitual control can contribute to the effective deployment of cognitive routines that facilitate productive and flexible cognition. This proposal is consonant with recent research emphasizing the pervasive role of model-free control in related elements of higher-level cognition (18, 19), including the gating of working memory (20) and the construction of hierarchical task representations (21). These models offer an appealing functional explanation for the neuronal connections between striatum and frontal cortex (22).

**A reinforcement learning perspective**

Our proposal can be formalized in the reinforcement learning (RL) setting (23). RL models are widely used in cognitive research because they capture several core features of learning and choice, including in humans (1, 6, 24). We draw especially on two features of RL: The implementation of habitual versus planned action, and the implementation of hierarchical control.

The core principles of habitual and planned control are embodied in two broad classes of RL algorithms. Model-based RL maintains an explicit causal model of the world and uses it to choose actions by assessing their likely consequences. Thus, it enables goal-directed planning. In contrast, model-free RL does not maintain an explicit causal model, and therefore does not allow planning. Rather, it assigns value to candidate actions based on their context-dependent history of reward. The resulting cached policies (akin to stimulus-response habits) are globally adaptive, but may exhibit local irrationality (24, 25). Elements of model-free RL, including prediction-error updating and temporal difference learning, are implemented in the midbrain dopamine system (26-28). Human behavior also relies extensively on model-based planning towards goals, which depends on diverse cortical and subcortical regions (4, 24, 29-31).

Hierarchical control is often accomplished in RL by grouping actions into “options” (12). An option is a sequence of actions (or “policy”) bundled collectively for selection by a superordinate controller. For example, tying a bow comprises many individual actions, but these are bundled into a single motor routine. This allows a valuable policy to be generalized across contexts (“policy abstraction”). For instance, learning to tie a bow when putting on one’s shoes can generalize to tying a bow while trussing a turkey. In machine learning contexts intra-option policies are sometimes specified by the programmer; alternatively, they may be learned by model-free methods (16) or by concatenation via repetition into a chunked action sequence(9, 10). These approaches are well suited to situations where the optimal intra-option policy remains constant across episodes, as with tying a bow.

These approaches are poorly suited, however, to circumstances where an intra-option structure is more variable, as when a journalist attempts to secure an interview for a breaking story. Instead, such cases favor intra-option planning towards a goal. Compared with non-hierarchical (“flat”) model-based planning, defining options over reliably valuable goals is computationally efficient because it summarizes the expected rewards of implementing the goal, rather than deriving the expected reward from search over a full model of the task (13). For instance, a journalist can retrieve the cached value of pursuing interviews (learned from past experience), rather than deriving the value of these actions by search over many full-length policies for news reporting. Below, we illustrate these computational savings for a specific task.

In summary, modeling habitual goal selection in the reinforcement learning framework comprises three claims. First, hierarchical control can be implemented by defining options over goal states. Second, intra-option policies may be derived from model-based planning towards those goals states. Finally, options may be selected according to cached values derived from model-free update. These features complement tasks where pursuit of a sub-goal is reliably valuable (favoring the computational efficacy of model-free valuation of an option), but the means of achieving the subgoal is highly variable (favoring the flexibility of model-based planning within the option).

Our proposal can be contrasted with the recent suggestion that humans may sometimes employ goal-directed control in a manner *superordinate* to habitual action (8-9). We seek evidence of the opposite relationship; yet, these models are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they share the common assumption that humans will flexibly adapt the use of habitual and goal-directed control across levels of hierarchically organized behavior in order to suit the demands of a particular task. In other words, both propose a “heterarchy” of behavioral control.

The possibility of habitual control over goal selection complements several existing models in RL and psychology (11-13). Some RL algorithms have implemented model-free control over hierarchical goal selection, and with promising results (12). This formal approach to model-free control over model-based planning has not, however, received a direct experimental test in humans. Meanwhile, psychological models of hierarchical planning recognize the problem of goal selection and have implemented a number of solutions, varying in scope and specificity. These include the use of hidden-layer backpropagation networks (14), Pavlovian search heuristics (32), procedural learning mechanisms (33), the chunking of action sequences (30, 31), and other dedicated or domain-specific solutions (3, 34). Here, we aim to explicitly link a formal model of habitual control over goal selection to experimental data.

**Experiment 1**

Our task is adapted from a multistep choice paradigm used in prior research (24). The original paradigm behaviorally dissociates the influence of habitual (model-free) and goal-directed (model-based) control on choice. To do this, it exploits low-probability connections between behavior and reward. A mechanism employing model-free value update is sensitive to such rewards, stamping in the participant’s prior choice. In contrast, model-based planning over a known causal model of the task discounts the link between actions and reward in such cases according to their low probability of occurrence. By observing participants’ choices, the influence of model-free and model-based control can be dissociated. Several lines of convergent evidence support the alignment of these mechanisms with habitual and goal-directed control, including functional neuroimaging (24), transcranial magnetic stimulation (35), and manipulations of cognitive load (5) and stress (36), among others (37, 38; but see 9-10).

We modified this task to index not only model-free value assignment to actions (as in the original task) but also model-free value assignment to options defined by a goal (Figure 1A). At Stage 1 of each trial, participants choose between two actions drawn from the set [1,2,3,4]. These choices trigger stochastic transitions to Stage 2 states from the set [blue, red, green]. Finally, Stage 2 states deterministically transition to three unique reward distributions. The rewards change gradually over the course of the experiment. Thus, participants are motivated to choose Stage 1 actions that maximize the likelihood of transitioning to the current reward-maximizing Stage 2 state. Participants received detailed instructions and practice trials, including both explicit information about the stochastic transitions between Stage 1 and Stage 2 and extended practice with those transitions.

Macintosh HD:Users:fiery:Documents:Manuscripts:MFonMB:PNAS:revision:graphics:Fig1.pdf

***Fig. 1.*** *(****A****) In Experiment 1a participants performed a two-stage Markov decision task. They were presented with two possible Stage 1 actions drawn from a set of four. These transitioned with variable probabilities to a set of Stage 2 actions, which then transitioned deterministically to a set of drifting reward distributions. (****B****) The logic of the experiment depends on a subset of trials. For instance, participants might be presented with the choice set (1,2) in a setup trial. Upon selecting action 1, they experience a low-probability transition to the green state followed by a large reward. A model-free influence on goal selection uniquely predicts an increase in the selection of action 3 on the subsequent critical trial, because actions 1 and 3 share the common goal state of blue.*

Our analysis depends on a subset of trials (Fig. 1B). For example, a participant is presented with the choice set (1,2) at Stage 1 and chooses action 1. Because 1 typically leads to the blue state, we assume that this participant’s goal was to transition to blue. On our “setup” trials, however, they experience a low-probability transition to the green state, and then experience a very large reward. A model-based system would discard this information because transitions to the green state are equally likely from all Stage 1 options. This renders forward planning toward green irrelevant. In contrast, model-free value update would increase the likelihood of selecting 1 on subsequent trials due to the history of reward following that action (24). Our interest, however, is in the model-free assignment of value to a goal—in this case, the goal of transitioning to blue. If the experience of reward increases the likelihood of selecting blue as a goal, then participants should exhibit a greater likelihood of choosing 3 on the subsequent “critical” trial (when paired with either 2 or 4). Conversely, the experience of punishment should decrease the likelihood of choosing 3. This influence of the reinforcement history of choosing 1 on the subsequent choice of 3 cannot be explained by model-free update of a value to the specific action (choosing 1); rather, it depends on the assignment of value to their shared goal (getting to blue).

*Experiment 1a*

We assessed choice on critical trials by comparing instances when the participant experienced reward vs. punishment on the preceding setup trial (i.e. following low-probability transition to the green state). Consistent with our prediction, the mean proportion of trials on which participants selected the shared-goal action following positive reward (85%) was significantly greater than the proportion following negative reward (69%) *t*(216)=-11.1, *p*<.0001. Further analysis of this data, and for all subsequent experiments, is presented in Supporting Information.

*Experiment 1b*

In Experiment 1a, each round of play required a single choice between two actions available at Stage 1. This structure does not illustrate the computational savings of model-free value update of options defined over goals. Because each “goal state” (red, or blue) deterministically transitions to a single reward distribution, planning towards the goal state is computationally equivalent to planning towards the reward distribution, and is thus no more efficient.

In order to differentiate subgoals from reward, and to thereby illustrate the computational savings of habitual goal selection, we extend our task to include two sequential rounds of choice (Fig. 2). In this task, when the participant arrives at a colored state in Stage 2, they face a choice between two actions. Each action delivers reward from an independent distribution with a drifting mean. Exhaustive model-based search of this decision tree from Stage 1 requires the agent to consider transitions and reward distributions for Stage 2 actions available from both the blue state and the red state (i.e., actions i-iv). By instead selecting an option defined over a Stage 2 goal state, planning over these transitions and rewards is truncated; the expected rewards are instead now summarized by the value assigned to the option.

Meanwhile, the definition of options over Stage 2 goal states enjoys a performance advantage over a flat model-free representation. Specifically, an options-based approach enables the learned value of a Stage 2 goal to propagate across Stage 1 actions that share high probability transitions to that goal. In other words, if selecting 1 is rewarding, that value propagates to selecting 3.

In Supporting Information we present formal models implementing pure model-based control, pure model-free control, and our proposed hierarchical integration. We simulate the performance of each model for Experiment 1b. We find that pure model-based control attains the highest level of performance (averaging $3.80 in bonus earnings), pure model-free control attains the lowest level (averaging $2.97), and the integrated model attains intermediate performance (averaging $3.53). This occurs because only pure model-based control appropriately discounts the history of reward attained subsequent to the Green state, while only pure model-free control fails to generalize across Stage 1 actions based on their common transition probabilities.

Macintosh HD:Users:fiery:Documents:Manuscripts:MFonMB:PNAS:revision:graphics:Fig2.pdf

***Fig. 2.***  *Experiment 1b extends the task introduced in Experiment 1a to include a second round of choice. This dissociates putative subgoal states (intermediate colored states) from the terminal states associated with reward.*

We then tested a new population of participants on this task. Consistent with our predictions, the mean proportion of trials on which participants selected the shared-goal action following positive reward (79%) was significantly greater than the proportion following negative reward (75%) *t*(242)=-3.2, *p*<.005. We also fit our formal model to participants’ choices in Experiment 1b, and found that our model was strongly preferred to a null model with the model-free goal selection mechanism removed (exceedance prob. = 1). Details are presented in Supporting Information.

*Experiment 1: Discussion*

Experiments 1a and 1b provide evidence consistent with habitual control of goal selection. In both experiments we observed a transfer of learned value across Stage 1 actions linked only by their common high-probability transition to a subsequent state. This suggests that participants either engaged in model-based planning over a non-hierarchical (“flat”) representation the task, or else assigned value to options indexed by the common goal of the subsequent state. However, flat model-based planning is not consistent with the observed influence of reward obtained after low-probability transitions to the green state. Because transitions to this state are equally likely following any Stage 1 action, they are irrelevant to planned choice between those actions. Thus, we tentatively conclude that participants adopted hierarchical control over options defined by goal states.

Two concerns limit our confidence in this inference, however. First, it is possible that participants come to represent Stage 1 actions with shared high-probability transitions as equivalent for purposes of the task. In other words, they may treat selecting “1” and selecting “3” as the very same action, performing model-free value update on this unified representation. This would account for our results without invoking hierarchical control. A superior experimental paradigm would ensure *de novo* construction of the intra-option policy using model-based methods on all critical trials. Second, it is possible that participants defined options not over the intermediate goal of attaining a Stage 2 option (e.g., “get to red”), but instead over the goal of a terminal state at Stage 3 (e.g., “get to Riii”). This mechanism would still predict a transfer of reward values across Stage 1 actions sharing common high-probability transitions, and it would still predict that option values would update based on rewards obtained following low-probability transitions to the green state. Although this alternative shares with our model the premise that options are defined by goal states, and also that intra-option control is accomplished by model-based methods, it is compatible with either model-free or model-based value update of options. This is because the highest level of control reduces to a simple bandit task in which model-based and model-free methods behave equivalently (see also 9, 10). We designed Experiment 2 to target both of these concerns.

**Experiment 2**

Experiment 2 involves a sequential decision-making task of similar structure to Experiment 1 (Figure 3). But, in Experiment 2, the Stage 1 “action” that participants must perform is a mathematical operation. Specifically, in Stage 1 participants were presented with a set of three numbers, two of which could be summed to 16, and another two of which could be summed to 21; for example, 7, 9 and 12. By selecting any two numbers that sum to 16, participants deterministically transitioned to one Stage 2 state (“State 16”), whereas by selecting any two numbers that sum to 21, they deterministically transitioned to another Stage 2 state (“State 21”).

We conceive of the abstract action “summation to 16” as an option defined by a goal state. As with the news reporter for whom interviews are always valuable, but must be pursued by variable means, Experiment 2 presents participants with a task in which value is restricted to a small number of goals associated reliably with reward (16 and 21), but in which goals may be attained by a wide array of actions (i.e., computing the sum of many different pairs of integers).

We limit our analysis to just those trials on which participants are presented with a novel set of numbers at Stage 1. This provides a strong safeguard against the possibility of “acquired equivalence” between Stage 1 actions. We assume that participants have not acquired an associative equivalence between all possible pairs of integers that sum to 16, or to 21, prior to the presentation of any given pair in our task.

In addition, Experiment 2 alters the structure of the transitions between Stage 2 and Stage 3 states in a way that allows us to differentiate between options defined over each stage. Crucially, there exists a Stage 3 state (Rii) that can be deterministically attained via either Stage 2 state (16 or 21). An option defined over this terminal reward state (Rii) and implementing model-based control would equally favor both summation operations (16 or 21), since both are sufficient to reach the goal. Only when options are defined over the intermediary Stage 2 states would reward obtained at Rii systematically bias subsequent selection of a particular Stage 1 action.

Macintosh HD:Users:fiery:Documents:Manuscripts:MFonMB:PNAS:revision:graphics:Fig3.pdf

***Fig. 3.*** *Experiment 2a employed a similar structure to Experiments 1a and 2b, but with two key differences. First, Stage 1 actions were determined by computing the sum of two numbers selected from a total of three presented on each trial. We analyze the subset of critical trials on which participants first encounter a new set of numbers. Second, both Stage 2 colored states contained an action that produced a deterministic transition to a single Stage 3 reward distribution (Riii). This feature dissociates the influence of options defined over Stage 2 goals from the influence of options defined over Stage 3 goals.*

We analyzed data exclusively on critical trials presenting novel sets of numbers at Stage 1. Consistent with our prediction, the mean proportion of trials on which participants re-selected the same sum goal following positive reward (76%) was significantly greater than the proportion following negative reward (56%) t(30)=- 2.5, p<.05.

*Experiment 2b*

As we have discussed, habitual goal selection affords computational savings by caching a model-free value representation of goal pursuit—an abstract action defined by a goal. A variant of this proposal uses model-free update to assign value not to the action of pursuing a goal state (i.e., the option “summing to 16”), but instead to the state itself (i.e., “state 16”). This distinction is subtle but crucial. The latter model could explain the pattern of results obtained in Experiment 2a, but without invoking hierarchical control. Rather, control would be implemented by a “flat” model-based search over a decision tree truncated at Stage 2 states, based on values assigned to those states by model-free update.

Critically, this explanation could not apply to Experiments 1a and 1b, where value obtained after low-probability transitions to the green state influences subsequent choice. Because transitions to the green state are equally probable from each Stage 1 choice, value assigned to the green state cannot influence Stage 1 choice. Rather, such an influence implies that value was assigned to the action of pursuing the state as a goal (even if the state is subsequently not attained).

In order to distinguish between these possibilities, we adapted the logic from Experiment 1 and performed an additional experiment (2b) that implemented low-probability transitions from both summation operations to a third Stage 2 state (Figure 4). This state, indexed “State 0”, presents three available actions that deterministically transition to each of the Stage 3 states. Our analysis of this task depends on setup trials where participants transition to State 0 and subsequently choose action “ii”, which deterministically transitions to a reward distribution available from all Stage 2 states (Rii). On the subsequent critical trial, participants are presented with a novel set of three numbers at Stage 1. We find that they are more likely to repeat the summation goal that they previously selected on the setup trial following reward for state ii (72.3%), compared with punishment (54.6%, *t*(145) = -3.8, p < .001). This effect is consistent with model-free valuation of the previously selected option (e.g., “summing to 16”), but not with valuation of the previously visited Stage 2 state (“State 0”), which is equally available given any action at Stage 1.

Macintosh HD:Users:fiery:Documents:Manuscripts:MFonMB:PNAS:revision:graphics:Fig4.pdf

***Fig. 4.*** *In Experiment 2b, a low probability green state was grafted onto the core decision tree implemented in Experiment 2b. This dissociates model-free value update to an option (e.g., “get to State 16”) from model free value update to a state (e.g., “State 0”) on setup trials involving a low-probability transition from Stage 1 to Stage 2.*

Why might participants sometimes employ a hierarchical task representation that assigns value to options defined by goals (i.e., to goal-directed *actions*), rather than exclusively relying on a flat task representation that assigns value to truncated branches of a decision tree (i.e., to the corresponding *states*)? These approaches differ in that the former first selects a goal based on a cached value representation and then searches for a policy to attain it, whereas the latter first searches over potential (truncated) policies, discovering their values by planning. Past research shows that planning algorithms that exploit pre-selected goals, such as backward reasoning, can attain significant computational savings (39, 40). Savings may be particularly large in real-world domains where the set of possible actions from any given state is very large (e.g., the set of all conceivable actions that a journalist could take when assigned a new article).

**Discussion**

We find that goal selection in humans is partially determined by model-free value representations derived from reward history. These goals are subsequently used during model-based planning over an internally represented causal model of the task structure. In our experiments this mechanism appears suboptimal, because participants could easily have performed an exhaustive search over candidate goals and thereby attained a higher average rate of reward. Yet, the same mechanism mitigates the computational burden of full model-based evaluation for the kinds of complex tasks that we routinely face in everyday life.

While our proposal relies upon the conceptual distinction between habitual (model-free) and planned (model-based) behavioral control, it also demonstrates a mutual dependence between them. This integration captures several empirical phenomena that blend features of habits and goals. Contextual cues can trigger goal pursuit outside of conscious awareness (41), consistent with the operation of stimulus-response habits in the process of goal selection. In cases of “utilization behavior” among individuals with insult to prefrontal cortex, goal-directed behavior may be intrusive or inappropriately invoked based on contextual cues (42). Among neurotypical individuals, “functional fixedness” describes the tendency to consider a limited set of candidate means-end relationships based on past experience with a tool (43). Finally, it is observed in educational settings that the execution of controlled cognitive processes improves with practice—in other words, that learning complex tasks requires the incremental acquisition of appropriate habits of thought (44, 45).

Habitual goal selection can reduce the computational demands of behavioral control, but there is no free lunch: By relying on habit, an agent forgoes the opportunity for optimal planning. This is apparent in our task, where model-free goal selection reduced participants’ payoff, compared to the reward full model-based evaluation could attain. Thus, humans face the challenge of optimally balancing the efficiency of model-free control against the productivity of model-based control. Several promising avenues of research explore how we accomplish this (7, 46-49).

Within the present framework, one approach to fine-tuning this balance is to select and evaluate multiple candidate goals. The model we implemented allows only a single goal to be retrieved and adopted, but a simple extension of this model would retrieve multiple goals with a probability proportional to their model-free value. Then, the value of policies subsequent to each candidate goal state could be evaluated by model-based means (13). In this case, the function of model-free value assignment would be to reduce the size of the planning task, rather than to eliminate it.

The utility of habitual goal selection also depends, of course, on the accuracy of the model-free value representation. An agent with highly accurate representations sacrifices little by turning over goal selection to model-free control, while an agent with inaccurate representations sacrifices much. In our experiment, model-free value representations are set by the history of reward. However, obtaining sufficiently accurate representations exclusively by trial-and-error is not feasible for many complex tasks.

Critically, past research shows that model-free value representations are established by several other means. For instance, value representations can be cached during simulated experience derived from a causal model (8). In addition, both observational learning and direct instruction by social partners establish value representations (50-52). The possibility of cultural transmission of goal/subgoal structure by observational learning or instruction stands out as a likely explanation for the efficiency and power of goal-directed behavior in humans. Cached model-free value assignment to goal selection may serve as an important repository for cultural knowledge of this form. This implies a codependence between two capacities that are remarkably developed in humans: cultural transmission (53) and productive and flexible reasoning (54).

**Acknowledgments**

We thank Michael Frank, Samuel Gershman, Wouter Kool, Josiah Nunziato and members of the Moral Psychology Research Laboratory for their advice and assistance. This research was supported by grant N00014-14-1-0800 from the Office of Naval Research.

**Methods**

*Participants*

A total of 703 subjects were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk to participate in Markov decision tasks. Each subject participated in only one task. Subjects gave informed consent, and the study was approved by the Harvard Committee on the Use of Human Subjects.

Subjects were excluded from analysis if they timed out on more than 50 trials, or if their final accumulated score was below zero. After applying our exclusionary criteria, there were 217 subjects and 6090 critical trials in Experiment 1a, 243 subjects and 6206 critical trials in Experiment 1b, 49 subjects and 195 critical trials in Experiment 2a, and 194 subjects and 715 critical trials in Experiment 2b.

*Experiment Design*

The designs of our Experiments are summarized in Figures 1-4. The two Stage 1 options for each trial were always chosen such that the options led to different Stage 2 states (i.e. (1,3) were never paired in Experiment 1). All rewards distributions were initialized uniformly at random on a range of -4 points to +5 points, and varied according to a bounded Gaussian random walk for the remainder of the experiment. After each round, the drift was sampled from a normal distribution with (μ=0, σ=2), rounded to the nearest integer, and added to the current reward level. In cases where drift selected a reward level outside the bounds of [-4,5], the reward would ‘rebound’ by the amount of the excess. The rewards on setup trials (those immediately preceding critical trials) were boosted to their extremes by adding +2 or -2 points, depending on the reward distribution’s current sign. If the boost selected a reward level outside the bounds, the reward remained at the boundary amount.

After the experiment, participants received a bonus payment based on their accumulated points. Each point was worth 1 cent. Participants were informed of the value of points in the instructions. Each participant completed 75 practice trials followed by 175 rewarded trials. The practice trials were divided into three sections of 25 practice trials each. Sections were designed to ease participants into the task by introducing one task element at a time. On the rewarded trials, subjects had only 4 seconds to make their choice between the two numbers. If they did not make a choice within 4s the trial would time out and the next trial would begin. Practice trials had no time limit. Participants in Experiments 1a and 1b saw 26 critical trials each. The spacing of critical trials in Experiments 1a and 1b was chosen randomly, with the constraint that they had to be at least three trials apart from each other.

**References**

1. Dolan RJ & Dayan P (2013) Goals and habits in the brain. *Neuron* 80(2):312-325.

2. Thorndike EL (1898) Animal intelligence: An experimental study of the associative processes in animals. *Psychological Monographs: General and Applied* 2(4):i-109.

3. Norman DA & Shallice T (1986) *Attention to action* (Springer).

4. Balleine BW & Dickinson A (1998) Goal-directed instrumental action: contingency and incentive learning and their cortical substrates. *Neuropharmacology* 37(4):407-419.

5. Otto AR, Gershman SJ, Markman AB, & Daw ND (2013) The curse of planning: dissecting multiple reinforcement-learning systems by taxing the central executive. *Psychol Sci* 24(5):751-761.

6. Daw ND & Shohamy D (2008) The cognitive neuroscience of motivation and learning. *Social Cognition* 26(5):593-620.

7. Daw N, Niv Y, & Dayan P (2005) Uncertainty-based competition between prefrontal and dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral …. *Nature Neuroscience*.

8. Gershman SJ, Markman AB, & Otto AR (2012) Retrospective Revaluation in Sequential Decision Making: A Tale of Two Systems.

9. Dezfouli A, Lingawi NW, & Balleine BW (2014) Habits as action sequences: hierarchical action control and changes in outcome value. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 369(1655):20130482.

10. Dezfouli, A., & Balleine, B. W. (2013). Actions, action sequences and habits: evidence that goal-directed and habitual action control are hierarchically organized. *PLoS computational biology*, *9*(12).

11. Mannella F, Gurney K, & Baldassarre G (2013) The nucleus accumbens as a nexus between values and goals in goal-directed behavior: a review and a new hypothesis. *Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience* 7.

12. Sutton RS, Precup D, & Singh S (1999) Between MDPs and semi-MDPs: A framework for temporal abstraction in reinforcement learning. *Artificial intelligence* 112(1):181-211.

13. Botvinick M & Weinstein A (2014) Model-based hierarchical reinforcement learning and human action control. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 369(1655):20130480.

14. Botvinick MM (2008) Hierarchical models of behavior and prefrontal function. *Trends in cognitive sciences* 12(5):201-208.

15. Lashley KS (1951) *The problem of serial order in behavior* (Wiley, New York).

16. Botvinick MM, Niv Y, & Barto AC (2009) Hierarchically organized behavior and its neural foundations: A reinforcement learning perspective. *Cognition* 113(3):262-280.

17. Jong NK & Stone P (2008) Hierarchical model-based reinforcement learning: R-max+ MAXQ. *Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Machine learning*, (ACM), pp 432-439.

18. Dayan P (2012) How to set the switches on this thing. *Current Opinion in Neurobiology*.

19. Graybiel AM (2008) Habits, rituals, and the evaluative brain. *Annu. Rev. Neurosci.* 31:359-387.

20. O'Reilly RC & Frank MJ (2006) Making working memory work: a computational model of learning in the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia. *Neural Computation* 18(2):283-328.

21. Collins AG & Frank MJ (2013) Cognitive control over learning: creating, clustering, and generalizing task-set structure. *Psychological review* 120(1):190.

22. Miller EK (2000) The prefrontal cortex and cognitive control. *Nature Reviews* 1:59-65.

23. Sutton RS & Barto AG (1998) *Introduction to reinforcement learning* (MIT Press).

24. Daw ND, Gershman SJ, Seymour B, Dayan P, & Dolan RJ (2011) Model-based influences on humans' choices and striatal prediction errors. *Neuron* 69(6):1204-1215.

25. Dickinson A, Balleine B, Watt A, Gonzalez F, & Boakes RA (1995) Motivational control after extended instrumental training. *Learning & behavior* 23(2):197-206.

26. Bayer HM & Glimcher PW (2005) Midbrain dopamine neurons encode a quantitative reward prediction error signal. *Neuron* 47(1):129-141.

27. McClure SM, Berns GS, & Montague PR (2003) Temporal prediction errors in a passive learning task activate human striatum. *Neuron* 38(2):339-346.

28. O'Doherty JP, Dayan P, Friston K, Critchley H, & Dolan RJ (2003) Temporal difference models and reward-related learning in the human brain. *Neuron* 38(2):329-337.

29. Simon DA & Daw ND (2011) Neural correlates of forward planning in a spatial decision task in humans. *The Journal of neuroscience* 31(14):5526-5539.

30. Gläscher J, Daw N, Dayan P, & O'Doherty JP (2010) States versus rewards: dissociable neural prediction error signals underlying model-based and model-free reinforcement learning. *Neuron* 66(4):585-595.

31. Deserno L*, et al.* (2015) Ventral striatal dopamine reflects behavioral and neural signatures of model-based control during sequential decision making. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*:201417219.

32. Huys QJ*, et al.* (2012) Bonsai trees in your head: how the Pavlovian system sculpts goal-directed choices by pruning decision trees. *PLoS computational biology* 8(3):e1002410.

33. Anderson JR (1996) ACT: A simple theory of complex cognition. *American Psychologist* 51(4):355.

34. Cooper R & Shallice T (2000) Contention scheduling and the control of routine activities. *Cognitive Neuropsychology* 17(4):297-338.

35. Smittenaar P, FitzGerald TH, Romei V, Wright ND, & Dolan RJ (2013) Disruption of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex decreases model-based in favor of model-free control in humans. *Neuron* 80(4):914-919.

36. Otto AR, Raio CM, Chiang A, Phelps EA, & Daw ND (2013) Working-memory capacity protects model-based learning from stress. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 110(52):20941-20946.

37. Otto AR, Skatova A, Madlon-Kay S, & Daw ND (2014) Cognitive Control Predicts Use of Model-based Reinforcement Learning.

38. Doll BB, Duncan KD, Simon DA, Shohamy D, & Daw ND (2015) Model-based choices involve prospective neural activity. *Nature Neuroscience*.

39. Boyan JA & Moore AW (1996) Learning evaluation functions for large acyclic domains. *ICML*, pp 63-70.

40. Zhang NL & Zhang W (1997) Fast value iteration for goal-directed Markov Decision Processes. *Proceedings of the Thirteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence*, (Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc.), pp 489-494.

41. Huang JY & Bargh JA (2014) The Selfish Goal: Autonomously operating motivational structures as the proximate cause of human judgment and behavior. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 37(02):121-135.

42. Lhermitte F (1983) ‘Utilization behaviour’and its relation to lesions of the frontal lobes. *Brain* 106(2):237-255.

43. Adamson RE (1952) Functional fixedness as related to problem solving: A repetition of three experiments. *Journal of experimental psychology* 44(4):288.

44. Sfard A (1991) On the dual nature of mathematical conceptions: Reflections on processes and objects as different sides of the same coin. *Educational studies in mathematics* 22(1):1-36.

45. Perkins DN & Salomon G (1989) Are cognitive skills context-bound? *Educational researcher* 18(1):16-25.

46. Pezzulo G, Rigoli F, & Chersi F (2013) The mixed instrumental controller: using value of information to combine habitual choice and mental simulation. *Frontiers in psychology* 4.

47. Silver D, Sutton RS, & Müller M (2008) Sample-based learning and search with permanent and transient memories. *Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Machine learning*, (ACM), pp 968-975.

48. Daw ND & Dayan P (2014) The algorithmic anatomy of model-based evaluation. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 369(1655):20130478.

49. Huys QJ*, et al.* (2015) Interplay of approximate planning strategies. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 112(10):3098-3103.

50. Olsson A & Phelps EA (2007) Social learning of fear. *Nature Neuroscience* 10(9):1095-1102.

51. Biele G, Rieskamp J, Krugel LK, & Heekeren HR (2011) The neural basis of following advice. *PLoS Biology* 9(6):e1001089.

52. Doll BB, Jacobs WJ, Sanfey AG, & Frank MJ (2009) Instructional control of reinforcement learning: a behavioral and neurocomputational investigation. *Brain Research* 1299:74-94.

53. Boyd R, Richerson PJ, & Henrich J (2011) The cultural niche: Why social learning is essential for human adaptation. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 108(Supplement\_2):10918-10925.

54. Pinker S (2010) The cognitive niche: Coevolution of intelligence, sociality, and language. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 107(Supplement 2):8993-8999.

55. Statistical Package R (2009) R: A language and environment for statistical computing. *Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing*.

56. Bates D, Maechler M, & Bolker B (2012) lme4: Linear mixed-effects models using S4 classes.

57. Burnham, K. P., & Anderson, D. R. (2002). *Model selection and multimodel inference: a practical information-theoretic approach*. Springer Science & Business Media.

58. Stephan, K. E., Penny, W. D., Daunizeau, J., Moran, R. J., & Friston, K. J. (2009). Bayesian model selection for group studies. *Neuroimage*, *46*(4), 1004-1017.

59. McFadden, D.  (1974) “Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior.”  Pp. 105-142 in P. Zarembka (ed.), *Frontiers in Econometrics*.  Academic Press.